

**FIELD  
REPORTS  
ON  
DESEGREGATION  
IN THE  
SOUTH**



**Factors Affecting School Desegregation**

by

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## INTRODUCTION

Until September 1961, Dallas, Texas, was the largest city in the South with a completely segregated school system. Quite apart from this statistic, the decision to desegregate the city's schools was of great interest, both locally and nationally.

The traditions and customs of Dallas, in regard to racial matters, have been typically Southern. Although there has never been overt conflict between the races, nonetheless, the white population was against early desegregation. With their support, the Dallas school board invested much effort and money in legal maneuverings to avoid desegregation of the schools or, at best, to delay it. In a city-wide election, the voters expressed themselves approximately four to one against desegregation in the schools.

This climate should have made desegregation extremely difficult; yet, paradoxically, every close observer of the Dallas situation predicted peaceful desegregation. A statewide sampling of public opinion concerning desegregation, conducted by the Texas Poll immediately prior to the opening of school, showed 62 per cent accepting, 30 per cent opposed and 8 per cent undecided. This reflected a gradual increase in acceptance since 1956, when 42 per cent accepted, 47 per cent opposed and 11 per cent were undecided.

The Dallas situation became, in fact, a good example of peaceful school desegregation. It is to be hoped, therefore, than an account of the event and the careful preparation for it may offer suggestions and guide lines useful to leaders of other communities in similar situations. We are not offering Dallas as a "model" for other cities. Obviously, many aspects of the Dallas experience were unique. However, the broad outline of the desegregation program may be highly suggestive elsewhere.

The story of desegregation in Dallas is one of extremely careful planning, involvement of many people and groups, precise and well-timed dissemination of information, effective control, and accurate analysis of the factors involved. But there is another side, too. Some view it as a story of compromise and disappointment. This study will relate the planning and the event, together with the various views of it. We have made no attempt at *total* objectivity and have freely introduced questions and comments of our own. We have tried, however, to draw a clear line between editorial insertions and the chronology of events.

We wish to thank the many officials and private citizens in Dallas who patiently answered countless questions for us. Leaders of the Dallas Citizens Council, the police department, the school board, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, and the Dallas news media were most cooperative. Our sincere gratitude to Dr. Jack Connor, professor of English at Rice University and to Dr. Douglas Jackson, professor of sociology of religion, Perkins School of Theology, Southern Methodist University for their assistance in the preparation of the manuscript.

## LEGAL BACKGROUND

### The Fight Against Desegregation

On April 16, 1961, a five and one-half year battle on the part of the Dallas school board to maintain segregated schools ended. The board's decision came only after every possible delay.

The Supreme Court had decreed on May 31, 1955, that desegregation must come with all deliberate speed. Almost immediately following this second major decision in the school desegregation battle, Negro plaintiffs sued for admission to previously all white schools in Dallas. (The suit, *Borders vs. Rippey*, was brought against the president of the Dallas school board on behalf of 24 Negro plaintiffs.) In the subsequent period, the struggle between plaintiffs and the Dallas school board moved in and out of the Federal District Courts and the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, each time edging closer to the inexorable solution — desegregation.

The Dallas case had been heard a total of four times by the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in New Orleans. Then, on February 18, 1960, the court ordered the school district to file a desegregation plan by May. The Dallas school board was sharply criticized for delays in integrating its schools. The Chief Justice explained his objections in this way: "We've been engaged in legal literature for five years without action . . . actually the first step has not been taken on this matter. The School Board has not yet come forward with a plan. Words without deeds are not enough."

On March 5th the school board, in a special session, voted unanimously to authorize the circulation of petitions for a school integration referendum in compliance with state law. (Were the public schools to be integrated without the referendum, under Texas law the school district would lose state aid of some \$2,700,000 as well as accreditation.) School board president Franklin E. Spafford stated that the "signing of a petition does not in any way indicate approval or disapproval of desegregation." Because of the poor response to the petitions, Mr. Spafford, on March 14th, further emphasized the board's support of the referendum and the fact that signing did not reflect a person's stand. On June 2nd, as signatures on petitions neared the needed number, he once again felt it necessary to issue a clarifying statement:

Various rumors have come to my attention, such as each teacher is required a certain number of signatures or that those who don't are having their salary checks held up. I want to spike all such rumors here and now. No teacher is required to do anything concerning the petition, we appreciate their help, but it is purely voluntary on the teacher's part and under no circumstances will the school district take unfavorable notice of a teacher who either cannot or does not assist with the petition.

The school board did, however, request the Superintendent of Schools to "encourage" school district personnel to obtain as many signatures as possible.

On June 4, 1960, the district had enough signatures to hold the referendum to determine voter sentiment regarding desegregation, and it was set for August 6th. The vote was 30,324 to 7,416 *against* desegregation. Fortunately, this result did not carry the financial hardship feared; the Texas Attorney General, Will Wilson, ruled that a

school district under Federal Court order to desegregate would not be denied state funds, even without a favorable referendum vote.

### Plans for Desegregating the Schools

On April 30, 1960, the board, through its attorneys, filed with U. S. District Judge T. Whitfield Davidson in Dallas a "stair-step" plan proposing to desegregate the first grade in September of 1961 and to encompass an additional grade each subsequent year until the twelve grades were mixed. This plan retained to the board broad transfer provisions, such as the stipulation that should a student find himself a member of the minority race in his assigned school, he could then transfer to a school in which members of his race were a majority.

On May 25th, Federal District Judge Davidson disapproved the "stair-step" plan and suggested instead a "salt-and-pepper" plan. This was a proposal to set up certain "test schools" scattered throughout the district, where parents favoring desegregation might send their children on a voluntary basis. (The late Lynn Landrum, a feature columnist on the staff of the Dallas Morning News had long advocated this type of plan.) On May 26th, the board filed such a plan with the court, but conditioned its acceptance on voter approval of desegregation.

On June 4th, the District Judge instructed the board to alter the "salt-and-pepper" plan so that its approval would *not* be tied to a referendum election. On June 13th, the board re-submitted both plans, with neither tied to the referendum. On June 14th, the District Judge once again rejected the "stair-step" plan; the "salt-and-pepper" plan was ordered into effect in September 1961. Appeals immediately went forth to the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals from both the school board and the plaintiffs.

On November 30th, the Fifth Circuit Court reversed the Dallas jurists' "salt-and-pepper" plan as "a total misconception of the nature of the constitutional rights asserted by the plaintiffs." At the same time, the court approved the original "stair-step" plan; the transfer provisions accompanying the plan were rejected because "they might tend to perpetuate racial discrimination" by recognizing race as a grounds for transfer.

On December 27th, attorneys for the board filed a motion for a rehearing of the November 30th ruling. It challenged the ruling for striking the transfer provisions and for rejecting the "salt-and-pepper" plan.

On January 6, 1961, the Fifth Circuit Court responded by denying the motion, thus leaving the district with the order to desegregate along the "stair-step" plan. The Court noted that the district had 90 days to seek its last recourse — the United States Supreme Court.

At a special meeting on January 11th, the board's attorney, Mark Martin, advised against further appeal.<sup>1</sup> Subsequently, at the close of the 90-day period (April 6th), school officials declined to exercise an appeal since there had been no new court decisions during the period which would have changed the status of the Dallas case. Some observers believe the board was also motivated by a supplementary opinion from the Fifth Circuit Court pointing out that, under the Texas Pupil Placement Act, the district would still have wide powers of transfer.

1. The board's legal work was handled by the firm of Strausburger, Price, Kelton, Miller and Martin. Henry W. Strausburger was the board's principal attorney.

# PREPARING THE CITY FOR DESEGREGATION

## The Role of the Dallas Citizens Council

When the school board disclosed that it had exhausted its legal recourse and proposed to desegregate certain schools, it found ready and willing allies in the Dallas Citizens Council.

A gentlemen's agreement was made (although never stated publicly) that all preparation would be technical and professional, and, therefore, the exclusive concern of the school board and the school administration. On the other hand, the Council seemed better equipped to undertake the massive task of preparing a "reluctant" city — one which was to vote more than four to one against the referendum for desegregation. The civic group assumed full responsibility for preparing Dallasites to accept the imminent social change; reportedly, activities in this direction were begun by the Council as early as March of 1960.<sup>2</sup>

A vast "conditioning" program — perhaps the first of its kind, and certainly the most comprehensive in the South — was put into effect in order to pave the way for peaceful desegregation. Periodic newspaper releases sketchily described various aspects of the program, but details of the project, including its mechanics and philosophy, were not revealed until August 4, 1961, when the DCC called a special news conference.

*The DCC and Dallas:* The Dallas Citizens Council has been variously described as "the City's super-civic dads," "an organization of leading business executives" and "a junta of the city's boss-men who can make decisions without awaiting anyone's approval." Chartered in 1937, its purpose was set forth as follows:

This corporation is formed to study, confer and act upon any matter, civic or economic in character, which may be deemed to affect the welfare of the City of Dallas, the County of Dallas or the State of Texas, and to support any educational or civic enterprise deemed to promote such welfare.

The entire Council consists of 250 members — owners or executive heads of some of the city's major corporations. The group is not elected; thus, it is not responsible to the people or to other community leaders. There is a 24-man board, which meets monthly to take up any matter which, according to members, is not political.

George Fuermann, writing in "The Reluctant Empire," (Doubleday and Company, 1957) described the Council as follows:

Dallas has a city manager, it elects a mayor and a city council, but the Citizens' Council runs the city. Not responsible to the public, the Council rarely announces its decisions; only

2. Prior to 1959 the power structure of the city (The Dallas Citizens Council) had displayed little interest in the school system aside from supporting bond issues; it had not endorsed candidates for the school board nor had it sought to influence the Superintendent of Schools. In 1959 this power structure sponsored a candidate who was subsequently elected to the board in 1959 and made president of the board in 1961. The former president of the board resigned in 1959 and did not seek re-election. It is said that this change in roles was "planned" in 1960 and became effective in 1961. It was the first factor indicating that there would be no further contesting of the admission of Negroes to the school system.

the effects of decisions become known. The Council's control has been watered down since 1949, when "Fortune" wrote about it, but public awareness was not followed by criticism because the Council benefits Dallas . . . the Council has impelled construction of Negro housing and a medical center; it instigated a \$22,000,000 program to help solve the city's water problem. It sees to it that what's good for Dallas is accomplished.

What price does the city pay for this benevolent oligarchy? *Large issues are settled without public participation.* Because of the DCC and the fact that local newspapers try to avoid contention, Dallas has no stage for public debate and no medium through which issues of public concern can be aired.

*The DCC Committee for Desegregation:* In March of 1960, seven members of the DCC were designated as a committee to prepare the city for desegregation of the schools and other public facilities. One of the members of the committee explained its ability to undertake such a task in terms of "power structure": "The power it [the committee] has is the weight of the people who belong to it." The president of the DCC, who headed up the committee, is the president of a public utility; his fellow workers in the group included the board chairman of a bank, two bank presidents, the head of a manufacturing firm, the head of a wholesale distributing firm, as well as the incumbent mayor. Added to the influence of this powerful committee was the full support of the 243 other Council members. (To protect their business and community roles, the committee members took great care to avoid personal publicity.)

Both the school board and the seven-man committee from the DCC realized that school desegregation alone would not be sufficient. Quietly, a systematic program of desegregation in other areas of community life was organized. Among the significant changes effected through this approach: 1) desegregation of the Dallas State Fair midway and State Fair musical; 2) the shifting of Negro plainclothes policemen into uniforms; 3) the serving of 156 Negroes in 40 major downtown eating places in a "one-day experiment" in preparing Dallas residents for school desegregation. (It was reported that the group was hand-picked and store owners advised in advance that Negroes would seek service); 4) the reclassification of some jobs plus financial upgrading by many Dallas employers (It was reported that the reclassification of jobs had been initiated by a field representative of the American Friends Service Committee, who found that 139 types of jobs were lumped under the titles of janitor and porter.); 5) public report that major downtown hotels would begin soliciting integrated conventions "if school desegregation proceeds without incident."

*Negro Committee for Desegregation:* It was clear to the DCC committee that they must have the support and cooperation of the Negro community in order to avoid displays of unrest in the city. Accordingly, they invited seven Negro leaders to join with them in a committee of fourteen to plan the course of desegregation.<sup>3</sup> This gesture of good will toward the Negro leadership of Dallas was made in the hope that this would deter Negro organizations from demonstrations or organized resistance that might upset the DCC's time table for desegregation.

There are conflicting stories of how the seven Negroes came to be chosen. The

3. *Southern School News* (June, 1962) gives the following information concerning the committee: "During May, the Dallas Negro Chamber of Commerce honored 15 leaders of both races who directed the campaign for community acceptance of the court's order.

"They are C. A. Tatum, Dallas industrialist who headed the biracial committee; former Mayor R. L. Thornton; George Allen, C. J. Clark, W. J. Durham, Karl Hoblitzelle, John E. Mitchell, E. L. V. Reed, A. Maceo Smith, James Aston, Carr P. Collins, the Rev. T. C. Estell, the Rev. B. E. Joshua, W. W. Overton, and Julius Schepps."



representatives of the Dallas Citizens Council contend that they were chosen from a group of 150 Negro leaders, known as the Dallas Citizens Committee, which represented every organization of any significance in the Negro community. Rhett James, Negro minister and an NAACP official, maintains that the Negro Committee represented only four or five organizations of the community and probably spoke for no more than 20 per cent of the Negro population of Dallas. He further indicates that the seven-member committee which worked with the white group was largely self appointed. In his opinion, only the church gave support to the Dallas Citizens Committee; thus, other types of organizations whose approach might have been less conciliatory and more aggressive were not represented.

Two problems immediately confronted the seven Negro members of the larger committee. One, it was not clear to the Negro community that the committee was to be considered its official spokesman and, secondly, the Negro community had no organization analagous to the DCC from which to select its leaders. Good men came forward, but they did not represent organized strength. In terms of "power structure," therefore, the Negro leadership was at an immediate disadvantage.

Despite this, the Negro leaders were expected to speak for the entire Dallas Negro community. They were asked to pledge that there would be no demonstrations which might embarrass the desegregation plans or incite others to action. They agreed to make the attempt. Unlike their white counterparts, however, the Negroes had no real economic sanctions at their disposal; verbal persuasion was their only method of gaining support. In the months that followed the formation of the fourteen-man committee, parts of the Negro community threatened to demonstrate or otherwise to violate the pledge of their seven representatives. It was necessary for the white members to allow considerable leeway to the seven Negro members in order to permit them to protect their leadership role. They had to have concessions and show evidence of effective bargaining from time to time.

From the beginning of the negotiations in the combined committee, it was clear that the real control was in the hands of the white members. They frankly laid out the program by which school desegregation (and desegregation in other selected areas) was to be accomplished. In return for these gains the Negro members were to secure the good will and cooperation of their people. At first the Negro members felt themselves in a strong bargaining position. They advanced eleven points of a program and proposed to support their wants with sit-in and picket demonstrations. The 1960 meetings were stormy, but the white members bought time and delayed action.

A pattern of communication began to develop. The entire committee met as often as once a week; a select sub-committee of three white members met even more frequently. (A DCC member indicates that, although the whole committee met on at least 50 different occasions, the three-member group got together 159 times.) This smaller group agreed upon strategy and reported back to the complete committee. The fourteen-member group then informed and, presumably, won the support of the whole community. The white members accomplished this through the Dallas Citizens Council. The Negro members had a more difficult time. They reported back every Saturday morning at public meetings held in a church. The churches were expected to diffuse the plans and procedures among the rest of the Negro population.

Another difficulty arose for the Negroes, hampering their effective bargaining. Not only were they poorly organized, but the great majority of the population remained apathetic to their efforts. According to one explanation, most Dallas Negroes had come from rural East Texas with its strong Southern traditions. They found themselves making more money in Dallas than ever before; moreover, they were impressed with the few instances of desegregation in evidence. In short, they were unwilling to jeopardize a situation they could tolerate for unknown possible gains.

The Negro members of the planning committee were in a very ambivalent position. On the one hand, they sought to win from the larger committee as many gains as possible for the Negro; on the other hand, they sought to contain the Negro community and keep down demonstration. This role of compromise was not acceptable to many, but the seven leaders handled it skillfully.

### **The Role of the NAACP**

The seven Negro members of the planning committee provided the DCC delegates with one of their appeals — that the whole problem of peaceful desegregation in Dallas was being conducted by citizens of Dallas without the aid or interference of outside organizations. The role of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People was played down in all public statements and reports of the planners.

Although unrecognized, the NAACP probably played a role greater than most Dallasites were willing to admit. It was the visit to Dallas on March 5, 1960, by Roy Wilkins, Executive Secretary of the NAACP, that served as the occasion for the first bi-racial meeting of planners. Mr. Wilkins had come from New York to address a public meeting sponsored by the Southwest Regional Conference of the NAACP. White leaders feared he had come to help instigate sit-ins and other forms of overt demonstration. In their meeting with him, they suggested the continuance of a bi-racial committee composed of Dallas citizens who would work for desegregation. Six of the seven Negro members on the planning committee were officially connected with the NAACP.

The NAACP maintained a subtle influence during the entire course of preparation. Although there were few instances of organized Negro demonstrations between March of 1960 and September of 1961, behind the calm was the threat of overt activity. The white leaders were aware that the Negro members of the planning committee could not fully contain the entire Negro community. At least once a brief demonstration was started — and withdrawn after one day at the urging of the seven Negro committee members. This sort of near collapse of communication with the Negro community made the white planners aware of the possibility of organized NAACP activity. Some feel that this threat won additional gains for the Negroes in the planning sessions, as, for example, in the case of desegregating park facilities.

In February of 1961 the City Council was asked to desegregate city parks and refused. Following the refusal, an attorney for the NAACP addressed large groups of Negroes, indicating that there were plans to picket the park. Mayor R. L. Thornton, according to an NAACP official, then urged the City Council to reverse its decision and it complied.

## THE CAMPAIGN FOR PUBLIC APPROVAL

### The Appeal to Civic Pride

In early discussions among DCC members, it became apparent that individual motives for advocating desegregation differed widely. Undoubtedly, many were concerned with the moral aspects of the problem. However, as an organization dedicated to the good of the business interests of the city, the Council, as a body, was prompted to action primarily by economic considerations.

Strict segregationist policies were seen as bad for business. Speaking of the economic disadvantages of strict segregation, one prominent member of the Council noted that some 250 national organizations refuse to hold conventions in segregated cities. The estimated loss of revenue to Dallas from these conventions was placed at 50 to 100 million dollars per year.

The DCC realized, however, that not everyone is warmed by the thought of improved convention trade. The problem, then, was to find a goal so broad and so fundamental that no Dallasite could fail to identify with it or reasonably refute it. Among the obvious appeals which had to be eliminated — the argument that segregation is in violation of the moral rights of the Negro community. The planners of the campaign felt that “do-gooders, moralists, and intellectuals” represented too few.

The state of Texas is legendary for its pride, but Dallasites have more than their statistical share. Their city, affectionately called “Big D,” is considered the cultural, intellectual and social pace setter for the world. The motto carved on the plant of a local newspaper: “The Times Herald stands for Dallas as a whole,” is as appealing here as it might be elsewhere to proclaim that “the G— stands for fair and accurate reporting of the news.” It is important in Dallas to be loyal to Dallas.

This single appeal proved broad enough to encompass all elements within the population and to call forth strong support from all. Along with pride in Dallas, it was continually stressed that anything less than good citizenship and full respect for law would reflect discredit on the city.

The press gave firm support to these basic appeals. As early as December 2, 1960, the Dallas Morning News editorialized on the subject of desegregation: “. . . Dallas is bound to obey it. Any other course will subject our city to the unruly, uncivilized and ineffective cat-fighting which is disgracing New Orleans and which made Little Rock a by-word all over the world.”

The constant contrast with Little Rock and New Orleans served the Dallas planners well. Still another editorial in The Dallas Morning News stated (April 8, 1961):

The citizenry must now face the situation as the school board faces it. Alternative No. 1 is to do as Little Rock has done and as New Orleans is doing. In the opinion of The News,

there is neither merit nor satisfaction in that course. Alternative No. 2 is to begin now preparing in every way we honestly can to go ahead with this experiment under conditions which will give it a chance to succeed. . . .

**The Superintendent of Schools was even more pointed:**

Dallas is a proud city. I cannot imagine a community state of mind other than to contribute to and to guarantee fruition of this well thought-out plan. The civic clubs, churches, parent organizations in Dallas, the individual citizen himself, all have a stake in the successful outcome and a responsibility for the results.

Returning from Atlanta, where he had studied police procedures in school desegregation, Chief of Police Jesse C. Curry stressed civic pride. On August 31, 1961, he predicted success: "Dallas just does not have the radical factions that Atlanta does, and if they can do it we can too."

### **Molding Public Opinion**

The twin appeals to civic pride and good citizenship were not restricted to public statements and editorials. The DCC committee, after consultation with social scientists, law enforcement officials and citizens of other communities that had faced desegregation problems, set about rallying organizations numbering tens of thousands of Dallas residents to the cause of peaceful compliance with the law. No major group of citizens was overlooked. Parent-teacher associations, service clubs, women's clubs, the Dallas County Medical Society, the Dallas Bar Association, the Dallas AFL-CIO Council and the Greater Dallas Council of Churches were all approached with the most sophisticated of techniques (including professional advertising and public relations assistance) in order to get across the message: *good citizenship and the well-being of Dallas necessitate respect for the law.*

With the approval of the clergy and lay religious leaders, 100,000 copies of a booklet, "Dallas at the Crossroads," were distributed to congregations in Dallas churches. (Persons close to the desegregation process have stated that clergymen were not asked to participate in the planning stages of desegregation, but were willing to do what was asked of them during the last two or three months of the program.)

The message of peaceful desegregation was inserted into payroll checks and distributed with bank statements. Thousands of posters, showing faces of happy Dallas children, urged the avoidance of violence.

Other written pieces and speeches on behalf of the opinion-molding program stressed the devastation caused by desegregation violence. It was pointed out that Little Rock had lost not only population and industry but evidence pointed also to widespread emotional illness among children. A publication entitled "Dallas Opportunity" summed up this viewpoint:

Violence is a problem that affects the whole community and not merely a few isolated segments of the school or business community. Violence destroys a community. It not only disrupts business and education, but undermines the health and moral fiber of all citizens. Extremist elements and self-seeking individuals come into control and the city's children are forced to bear alone a burden which is rightfully an adult responsibility.

Another tract widely distributed by the DCC put the conditioning program into focus:

...if Dallas' experience parallels that of other Southern cities — and there is no reason to suppose that it will not — schools are only one area of the community life in which Negro leaders will press for change. Restaurants, theatres, increased use of department store facilities, hotels and churches — all are likely targets. Here as with the schools, the problem may ultimately have to be resolved by law.

Respect for and acceptance of the law is a vital part of the American tradition. It is also part of the American tradition that every American citizen may hold whatever opinions he chooses on the questions of his time. Where his opinions differ from the law, as defined by the courts, the good citizen does not resort to violence to express his disapproval or attempt to violate the law. He endeavors to change the law by peaceful means and orderly means. This is his right as a free American.

In the present problem, brought to a head by the court's decision, the Dallasite is not asked to change his opinion on the subject, be it pro or con. He is asked to respect the law.

*The "Blue Book"*: Some of the steps described above were outlined in an unpretentious 37-page mimeographed manual which was made available to national media representatives and others seeking details on the work of the DCC by the public relations-advertising firm employed by the Council.

Known simply as the "blue book," the manual opens with a brief statement on the federal court order to desegregate, the far-reaching effects of how Dallasites conduct themselves and the who and why of the DCC. It then outlines the program for "reaching the public":

It is a recognized fact that the majority of citizens will act in accordance with standards established by those whom the citizens recognize as leaders of the community. From the beginning, then, it was deemed essential to promote the establishment of a behavior pattern by the upper 15 to 20 percent of the community. This behavior pattern could be established and promoted by the active endorsement of and participation in this program by all leading city groups by asking all leading citizens to "stand up and be counted" for law and order.

The program was literally "walked through" these groups for their approval and support.

It was recognized that many members of the public do not belong to organized service clubs, do not regularly attend church, do not as a matter of course read the editorial pages of daily papers. It is likely that events of violence, should they occur, would spring from this group.

Material related to the program, as was done with the upper 15 to 20 percent of the community, will be "walked through" this group. This includes house to house distribution of this material in specially selected low income neighborhoods.

The pamphlet also describes meetings with Dallas leaders, and letters sent by the DCC to members of the clergy, the school board, the medical profession, the national press, municipal officials and radio and TV stations in the area. Quotations of exhortation for law and order from 10 key Dallasites are included together with samples of the materials distributed by the DCC and selected newspaper comments.

The final section of the book is directed to Dallas merchants and to hotels, restaurants and business institutions with segregated facilities; it asks for a review of operations in relation to this problem. The manual then proceeds to spell out for these business interests a procedure for change.

*"Dallas at the Crossroads"*: The basic educational instrument of the campaign was a thirty minute film prepared and distributed by the advertising agency assisting the DCC committee. Although the film was intended to be rather "homespun," it has an obvious professional quality. The narrator, who remains unnamed, is Walter Cronkite.

The film begins, without title or credit lines, with scenes in a church. The initial note struck is one of civic pride — Dallas is a great city. A second theme — change is inevitable — is introduced: a series of old pictures of Dallas suggests the great improvements change has wrought in the city. The thought is then advanced that Dallas faces another change, the desegregation of some of its public schools. Other cities, the viewer is told, have met this change with physical violence. Scenes of mob action at Little Rock and New Orleans illustrate the nature of mob activity.

The rest of the film shows a series of well-known civic leaders whose statements reveal their positions and roles although they are not identified by name. A physician warns of the physical harm that fear can do to a child; the dean of a law school stresses that real security is to be found only in the law. Two lawyers and a judge appear in an empty courtroom to describe the chief roles in legal action and to explain how desegregation became a law through judicial ruling; they emphasize that violence cannot change these legal rulings and that good citizens use the courts as their battle grounds. The mayor of Dallas appears to voice his pride in the greatness of the city.

A minister, a labor leader, the editors of both Dallas newspapers, and a former mayor of the city pledge the support of their various groups to non-violent school desegregation and plead for public cooperation. Finally, the chief of police appears to compare violence, riot and mob action to murder, and to warn that those who refuse to obey the law can expect to be arrested.

The movie closes with a group of school children repeating the pledge of allegiance to the flag of the United States.

*"Dallas at the Crossroads"* was extremely effective as an instrument of mass education for these reasons:

*It is strongly identified with local groups.* Separate introductions, for both white and Negro viewers, were prepared to accompany the film; each group which borrowed it promised to read the prepared introductory remarks. The introductions explained that the film had been produced with the cooperation of the organizations whose representatives appeared in it. Thus, the viewers were given a broad base for identification.

*It has a simple and direct message.* No effort was made to place the issue of desegregation on a moral or ethical base. The appeal was wholly directed to civic pride and respect for the law. As the producers of the film saw clearly, it is difficult to criticize those basic postulates; thus, they could be the means of unifying all sorts of groups and interests. The focus of the appeals was specific. For the religious — a prayer and a church interior; for the sentimental — a new-born baby and the great skyscrapers of Dallas. The potential lawbreaker would see the interior of a jail and hear

the lock click shut on a lawbreaker; an intellectual would hear the statement of a publisher who is known as the champion of the intellectual in Dallas. Only the Negro would have difficulty finding a symbol or person to identify with; there were no Negroes in the film. This decision was dictated by the reasoning that the film was intended to discourage violence and that there would be no violence arising from within the Negro community. The film, therefore, was intended primarily for white viewers.

*The film received careful distribution.* It was felt that greatest impact value would be achieved if people were to view the film in groups in special showings. The argument against televised showings was that the home viewer would act and respond as an individual, without the reinforcement of group participation to heighten his response. He might easily reject the message or remain unimpressed. As a member of a group whose leader had requested the film, he would be more likely to watch it in his role as responsible citizen, working man, churchgoer or parent. The film would then have not only intrinsic impact, but the added prestige of the sponsoring group. Accordingly, the film was made available without charge to any Dallas group that requested it. Moreover, the distributors provided an operator to bring the film to the group and handle all mechanical details of projection. The sponsoring groups were asked to read the prepared introductions, show the film, and close the meeting with a prayer. Question periods were discouraged. These conditions were considered most favorable for maximum control.<sup>4</sup>

During the last three days before desegregation, Dallas television stations showed "Dallas at the Crossroads" to cover any significant number of citizens who had not been able to view it in more intimate settings.

### **Public Opinion Within the Negro Community**

The goal of compliance for the sake of Dallas was more popular with the white population of the city than the Negro. Members of the Negro community feared that a higher and more moral motive was passed over in an effort to find a commonly acceptable basis for action. Furthermore, they felt that future efforts at desegregation would be handicapped.

A local minister and NAACP official summed up this position as follows: "No matter what you are given in civil rights, it must be given with action. Otherwise, it is patronage."

It was felt that publicity geared to equate public demonstration with lawlessness would destroy the climate conducive to organized picketing, sit-ins and other forms of direct action by the NAACP and similar organizations. It was suggested that a Negro trying to organize a picket of downtown theatres in an effort to achieve equal rights might appear to be as disloyal to Dallas as a white mother shouting insults at a Negro child entering a school.

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4. The planners limited themselves to techniques promising a controlled situation. Public speaking by prominent Dallasites and the use of clergymen to reach lower income groups were discouraged because the nature of response was unpredictable.

## THE PLAN IN OPERATION

On September 6, 1961, eighteen Negro children entered first-grade classes in eight formerly white schools.<sup>5</sup> The Superintendent of Schools indicated that only twenty-two requests for transfer to white schools had been received by the district during the two-week period of time set aside for such applications.

In the opinion of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), school officials had made it unnecessarily difficult for Negro children to enter the white schools. Although desegregation was to take place only at the first-grade level, Negro students had to "transfer" to their new schools. (A Negro student belonged to a Negro district, regardless of where he lived in the city; thus, it became necessary to transfer to a white district in order to enter a "desegregated" school.)

### Regulations Governing Transfer

The physical mechanics of obtaining a transfer were very cumbersome. First, transfer pupils had to provide the same information required of pupils new to Dallas schools: birth certificate, evidence of smallpox vaccination and diphtheria immunization, an enrollment information slip for school records, a census card, medical and dental health histories, and, of course, the actual application for transfer.

An application for transfer required signatures of the principal of the Negro school the child wished to leave, the principal of the white school he sought to enter, and that of the Coordinator of Administrative Services. Although the school board stressed that the school principals had instructions to forward all applications presented to them, the NAACP felt that some principals would be hostile to the applications. A mimeographed information sheet from the NAACP Dallas office to Negro parents interested in transfer advised:

Get a written statement from the principal of the Negro school which the child would normally attend. The statement will probably say that the child and parents insist on an integrated school, and that the principal of the Negro school advised against it. (Both Negro and white principals have orders to advise against attendance at desegregated schools.)

In a meeting on April 26, 1961, the Dallas school board specified sixteen factors which should control transfer of pupils:

1. Available room and teaching capacity in the various schools.
2. The availability of the transportation facilities.
3. The effect of the admission of new pupils upon established or proper academic program.
4. The suitability of established curricula for particular pupils.

<sup>5</sup> The schools and the number of children assigned to each: Amelia Earhart (3 boys), Ben Milam (1 boy), City Park (2 boys, 2 girls), Henry W. Longfellow (3 girls), Roger J. Mills (1 boy), Stephen F. Austin (2 girls), Thomas A. Edison (2 girls, 1 boy), William B. Travis (1 boy).



5. The adequacy of the pupil's academic preparation for admission to a particular school and curriculum.
6. The scholastic energy or ability of the pupil.
7. The psychological qualification of the pupil for the type of teaching and associates involved.
8. The effect of admission of the pupil upon the academic progress of other students in a particular school or facility thereof.
9. The effect of admission upon prevailing academic standards at a particular school, the psychological effect upon the pupil of attendance at a particular school.
10. The possibility of friction or disorder among pupils or others.
11. The possibility of breaches of the peace or ill-will or economic retaliation within the community.
12. The home environment of the pupil.
13. The maintenance or severance of established social and psychological relationships with other pupils and with teachers.
14. The choice and interests of the pupils.
15. The morals, conduct, health and personal standards of the pupil.
16. The request or concern of parents or guardians and the reasons assigned thereas.

The board stressed the application of these conditions to all races and colors alike. It would be interesting, however, to see an effort made to apply "the home environment of the pupil" as a reason for denying a white pupil admission to the white school nearest him. Apparently these rationales would justify denial of any pupil who attempted to enter a school previously reserved for another race. If it should so desire, the board could always call up numbers 10 or 11 — the possibility of breach of peace or ill will — or numbers 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, etc., all vague and applicable at will.

Further, the board specified several reasons to support transfer. Among them:

1. When a white student would otherwise be required to attend a school previously serving colored students only.
2. When a colored student would otherwise be required to attend a school previously serving white only.

All of these conditions of transfer and reasons to support transfer were calculated to *discourage* integration. This was thought wise by the school officials for the well-being of the entire school system. It was resented by the Negro leaders, especially in the face of the claims made by the press for Dallas as a model example of integration.

Still another difficulty in the transfer procedure appeared. The only times when applications were acceptable were from 1:30 until 3:30 in the afternoon and from August 14 through August 25, 1961. As the school officials must have known, many Negro families have two working parents, with most finding it impossible to be free during those rush afternoon hours. Since transfer involved five trips — the Negro principal, the white principal, a dentist, a medical doctor, and the school board — many of the lower income families could not arrange to apply. Negro leaders also noted that some of the families were away on vacations during the two week period and therefore unable to apply. The Superintendent of Schools had announced at one time that applications would be accepted during a brief period after school started, but on the day of desegregation (September 6), he announced to a morning press conference that the period of application was over. "We feel that we should not rock the boat." Thus, some who

thought they had been assured of another opportunity found that it was to be denied. Subsequently, the Superintendent of Schools publicly announced that additional applications for transfer would be accepted at a future date. It was further suggested that the probability of any colored applicant being granted a transfer was small. The reason given was that classes would be organized by then and the school program for the year would be well under way.

It is not clear just how many parents threaded their way through the maze of requirements and finally got an application submitted. The Superintendent of Schools announced to about 70 representatives of the local and national press on September 6 that a total of 22 applications were filed, of which 18 were accepted and only 4 rejected. The Superintendent explained the rejections: one was a defective application, not including a birth certificate; two had "no reason to transfer"; a final one fell under the "brother-sister" clause — a boy had brothers or sisters attending another school.

The famous "brother-sister" ruling, adopted during 1960 in Houston and borrowed by Dallas, is defended on the basis that it is not wise to break a family into two schools. If a child would, by reason of transfer, be attending a school other than his brothers or sisters, his transfer would not be approved.

A regional official of the NAACP, Clarence A. Laws, tells a different story about the number of transfer applications submitted and the reasons for rejection. He claims to have personally assisted 31 applicants file completed forms and in most cases to have accompanied the parents to the offices involved. He later talked with parents whose applications were rejected and described the reasons they said were given. One was told that he was one-tenth of a mile nearer an all-Negro school and must, therefore, attend it. Another was told that he was equidistant from white and Negro schools and must, therefore, attend the Negro school. One girl's application was denied because of the brother-sister clause, even though her brother did not live in the same household and would not be attending the all-Negro school in that district in any case.

It is not easy to determine who actually applied for transfer. The estimate of the NAACP may be accurate, however, since they are the organization which assumed responsibility for recruiting parents to apply. The school board itself did not publish or make available material to explain the complicated process, while the NAACP distributed numerous sheets of instruction and offered help in completing the process.

### **Integrated Schools Open**

During the first and second days of desegregation, the Superintendent of Schools, Dr. W. T. White, kept in constant touch with the principals of the eight schools; no incidents were reported within the schools. There were, however, several minor incidents from without:

- 1) A crude dummy was found hanging from a flagpole in front of a school not affected by desegregation.
- 2) Printed stickers urging "Don't mix white and Negroes" were affixed to the main door of another school not scheduled for desegregation.
- 3) A nineteen-year old "segregationist," carrying a gasoline-soaked cross, was

apprehended by police on the lawn of one of the desegregated schools during the early morning hours of Thursday, September 7th. The youth reportedly told police that he thought of planting the cross to protest desegregation; police filed arson charges.

- 4) A bomb threat at one of the desegregated schools was made by a telephone caller, who warned the principal that the explosive would go off at 9:30 a.m. A routine fire drill exercise was held while the building was searched. Officials were convinced that it was a hoax, since the school had been under round-the-clock surveillance for most of the week.

## **The Role of the Dallas Police Force**

*Preparing for Desegregation:* At its meeting of January 30, 1961, the Dallas City Council passed an "anti-mob ordinance." The new law, which prohibited "standing, remaining or congregating on any public street or sidewalk, or at the entrance, alcove or steps of any public or private building . . . so as to obstruct, prevent or interfere . . . with its use," called for citizens to "disperse and move on when ordered by the police or other peace officer." A maximum fine of \$200 for violators was specified.

Proponents, including Police Chief Jesse Curry, said there was no connection between the new ordinance and recent sit-in demonstrations or future desegregation plans for the public schools. The Dallas Morning News, however, editorialized along the following lines (February 1) :

At least 95 percent of the citizens of Dallas want a peaceful Dallas. Whatever they think of racial integration in the schools, they want the issue settled peacefully. That is the aim of the new ordinance.

Dallas' 1155 member police force began "mob control training" on April 15, 1961. The chief stated that the training program was especially designed to teach ways of preventing disorder arising from community tensions. Although this announcement was the first "official" indication of police planning, reliable sources indicate that a substantial amount of the preparatory work had begun in 1957, with on-the-scene surveys by former Chief of Police Carl F. Hanson and the Chief of Detectives of the desegregation crisis in Little Rock. Subsequent visits took top Dallas law enforcement officers to New Orleans, after which officials began compiling a manual outlining mob control training.<sup>6</sup>

On August 30th, Chief Curry returned from an on-the-scene observance of desegregation in Atlanta, Georgia. In a public release, the chief praised the work of Atlanta's chief. He noted the arrest of some young adults in a car loaded with "hate" literature, and reported Atlanta police had kept watch on several nationally known anti-Semitic leaders and other persons who had participated in anti-integration activities elsewhere. The chief summed things up by saying he was convinced that Dallas police procedures would operate as smoothly.

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6. The manual has been made available in spiral-bound pamphlet form and is the basis for a forthcoming book. It includes materials on control of tensions; the law and minority groups; the nature of racial prejudices; the effect of prejudices on minorities; history of racial tensions; areas of conflict; rumor, police preventative measures; minority group preventative measures; types of crowds; factors underlying crowd behavior; formation of a mob and police tactics; mobilization of community resources; the role of the press and quelling a riot.

*Patrolling the Integrated Schools:* On Tuesday night, September 5th, some twelve hours before the first Negro students were scheduled to enter the eight schools, Dallas police went into action. Command posts were set up at the eight schools; officers began round-the-clock surveillance with orders to question unauthorized persons venturing on school property. Reports indicated calm and quiet throughout the night.

On the following day, a special detail of fifty men was in the area of the eight schools. There were three inspectors and five captains in complete command at each school and a detective assigned inside each building. Except for the stationary command post outside each building, the only other uniformed officer was an extra traffic officer — to help with the heavy traffic load normal at elementary schools on the first day of classes.

Police dispatchers were given a special code system patterned along lines used in Atlanta. Signal "A" from a command post meant everything was under control; signal "B" signified an incident at a school that was under control; signal "C" would send regular district police squads into action; "D" would alert a special 50-man "reserve" squad; and "E" would send the men into action on an emergency basis.

As part of the overall preparedness program, Dallas police emergency station wagons (equipped with special riot control equipment) were stationed in the general vicinity of the schools on a stand-by basis. Additional precautions were taken by the Special Services Division, which serves the entire department on general police intelligence matters. During the past few years the department has maintained a careful vigilance on those extremist elements in the community such as the Ku Klux Klan and White Citizens Council which, from time to time, have been outspoken on racial or minority group problems. After a careful early morning briefing and circulation of photographs of known bigots, members of this division patrolled the vicinity of the schools before and after the school hours in unmarked cars. The specific function of this detail was to spot troublemakers who might be in the area. Preventive measures were so thorough that a car bearing a Georgia license plate parked two blocks from a school was immediately checked out, although the vehicle was properly parked and there was no apparent violation.

## THE PROBLEM OF THE PRESS

### Local Coverage

Regular press coverage took place for more than a year prior to school desegregation, and stories appeared almost daily in the weeks preceding the September school opening. Despite this conscientious coverage, the fact remains that local people did not receive all available and important news. Moreover, not all of the involved persons had access to communications media.

One of the first moves on the part of the DCC committee was to assemble the top-level mass media people in Dallas. This process is described in the official manual, the "blue book":

As representatives of Dallas' principal opinion molders, the executives of the city's newspapers, television stations, and radio stations were consulted during the formative stage of the program. Their solid support and participation was secured, and their suggestions and help have been invaluable.

In cooperating with the DCC, top media management made concessions which were not always agreeable to the working reporters. For example, stories were often held up so as to complement the work of the planning committee. Any story which might tend to arouse readers to unwanted activity was not published.

A DCC member explained the relationship between the Council and news outlets as follows: "We suggested that they simply ask themselves, 'Would this be good for Dallas?' before they released a story." Thus, the committee gained the advantage of consistency of image and appeal.

The obvious disadvantage of this kind of arrangement is suppression of current news the public has a right to know. Certain events on the Dallas scene were reported in Fort Worth, Houston and Austin papers and on national news service wires before being reported, belatedly, in Dallas. One local reporter told of having written a story about racial activity in Dallas which never appeared; he did, however, read a similar news story in a Houston paper.

The Dallas press made no mention of sit-ins and service of Negroes at downtown lunch counters during the period of March to May, 1960. Southern Methodist University theology students were in close contact with the NAACP, which in turn worked with the seven-member committee; it was decided that all news media would "suppress the stories." In late May or early June, an itinerant minister determined to integrate lunch counters although they had already been serving Negroes for two months. When he found the local news media unwilling to give him coverage, he turned to one of the wire services. The resulting news stories caused the cancellation of the agreement of the downtown stores to serve Negroes.

A student demonstration for desegregation, held at a campus drug store by Negro and white students of Southern Methodist University in January of 1961, was promptly reported in Forth Worth and over the wire services. The demonstration was not welcomed by white or Negro members of the planning group; it was a maverick protest instigated by two rebellious members of a student committee which had worked with representatives of the DCC during the 1960-61 academic year. Nevertheless, the story was repressed until forced into local papers by widespread coverage elsewhere.

On July 29, 1961, The Texas Observer, an Austin weekly, commented on this as follows:

Restaurant facilities in major Dallas stores and transportation facilities were integrated this week, but the city's news media fortuitously chose to ignore the whole thing. A Fort Worth television station made an honest attempt to report the news, but, otherwise, Dallasites had to wait for the wire service reports or catch a few sentences from CBS or NBC news programs. . . . Apparently the city's powers wanted to keep the whole affair out of the news and under cover.

In previous statements on other issues, executives of both Dallas papers had spoken out strongly for free and uncensored reporting of the news.

On August 30, 1961, the Dallas Morning News demonstrated rare integrity by reporting a criticism of "the recent blackout of news on the Negroes' sit-ins in Dallas restaurants." The critic, a representative of the Dallas Federation of Women's Clubs, said: "Now the question is how much news has been suppressed and how much is truth or fiction."

Clearly, the press effectively aided the plan for peaceful integration. Perhaps the greater good was served by the self-imposed policy of censorship. But, it is generally felt that the concept of cooperation was carried too far. One thing is clear: the working reporters, hampered by management's commitments, often felt frustrated in their attempts to keep the people of Dallas informed about racial happenings in their city.

## **National Coverage**

Approximately seventy representatives of the national press were on hand for the opening of the desegregated schools. Their friendly coverage was as much due to the careful planning of the Dallas Citizens Council as to the success of the events themselves.

Each member of the press received the DCC's "blue book"; many used it as the basis for most of their reports. This manual did not mention the school board or its role in planning for desegregation; it said little about the Negro community. Almost full responsibility for the good being done was assigned to the DCC.

A press room was set up in the school board's office building for the convenience of out-of-town reporters. The room contained television sets which monitored all the local channels and a manned police radio receiving calls from all the patrol cars in the area of the schools being integrated. A communication system connected the office of the Superintendent of Schools with the press. Thus, working reporters had im-

mediate access to a school official who was in constant touch with the principals of the integrated schools — all this without stepping foot outside the building!

Many reporters spent the whole of September 6th inside this room in the belief that this was the easiest way to stay in touch with all relevant sources of news. Sandwiches, soft drinks, fruit and candies were provided as part of the hospitality. (So outstanding were the physical accommodations that a New York Times reporter included a detailed description of the food and fruit that were served in his story of September 7th.)

Typical of the laudatory tone of national press comment was a Life Magazine editorial of September 22nd entitled "Our Salute to the South." In part, the editorial said:

It began when business leaders started to worry about the "public image" of Dallas and the damage that violence would do to business. It also involved a "no foolishness" Police Chief, who announced beforehand that violence would be severely dealt with. None occurred. A 19 year old youth who was caught preparing to put a gasoline-soaked cross on a school lawn said later, "It was a silly thing to do, and I'm sorry I did it." Dallas' School Superintendent reported, "We just couldn't have had a smoother beginning. . . . Everybody was polite, Negro and white alike." One white man watching colored children entering their first day of classes told police officials, "If there's any trouble, you call on me and I'll be around to help you."

Had representatives of the national press spent more of their time outside of the special room set up for them, would their stories have had a different slant? Probably not in the basic facts, but certainly visits to the Negro section of the community and talks with the parents and children who were directly affected might have modified the sense of overwhelming success. The regional NAACP executive officer stated publicly on September 7th that no reporters had tried to contact him.

It is obvious that widespread social change, affecting the basic pattern of living in the community and among individuals, cannot be achieved as simply as national press coverage made it appear. One wonders, therefore, whether the Dallas story, with all its many facets, was adequately publicized throughout the country.

## CONCLUSION

### A Feeling of Success

In describing the whole process of desegregating the schools, the Dallas Morning News labeled it a "success." In an article on September 10th the newspaper praised the work done by Chief of Police Jesse C. Curry, Superintendent of Schools W. T. White and the Dallas Citizens Council:

The smoothness with which the historic move went surpassed even their most optimistic hopes, nonetheless, there was the constant concern that something might go wrong, that the rosy picture might suddenly darken due to some unknown quantity they were powerless to check in advance.

The prominent leaders of the community agreed with this evaluation. A newspaper story of September 17, 1961 carried this headline: "Citizens Council Ready to Return behind the Scenes." The article began as follows:

Genial, soft-spoken C. A. Tatum was troubled. He slid into a chair at the Dallas News Saturday. still clad in the sport shirt he had worn to his farm earlier in the morning, and unburdened himself.

Mr. Tatum, the President of the Dallas Citizens Council, was troubled by the public role the Council had played in the school desegregation crisis. It was his hope, as expressed in the article, that the DCC could return to its more characteristic behavior of quiet, unobtrusive action for the betterment of Dallas.

### A Feeling of Disappointment

Since no organization or person is representative of all parts of the Negro community, it is impossible to present a single, consistent picture of this community's attitudes after the desegregation of the schools.

A statement issued by Clarence Laws, Southwest Regional Secretary of the NAACP, is a good indication of Negro reaction:

By desegregating eight public schools in an atmosphere of peace and calm today, Dallas has lived up to our high and confident expectations.

The NAACP has long taken the position that where responsible citizens, public officials and authorities take a firm stand for law and order, significant social changes can be accomplished without discord and violence. Today Dallas has confirmed that position.

As we commend the leadership of Dallas, however, we cannot forget the parents and children involved in this school transition. For without the courage and faith of these parents the historic step which was taken in education would not have been possible.

Now, if Dallasites can bring themselves to realize and appreciate that the destinies of all races, creeds and colors, which make up this enterprising community, are inseparably linked together, and that what is good and right for any one segment of the population is good for the whole then Dallas will have an unprecedented opportunity for continued growth and progress.



There is, first, pleasure that the task was undertaken and accomplished without civil disorder. There is a feeling that a door has been opened. Some of the better educated and younger leaders, however, are disappointed that more was not done. They fear that the token desegregation may serve only to foster complacency among whites and Negroes alike and that this will make for difficulty in rallying loyalty and active participation in programs for the extension of integration. To some degree, there is resentment that Negroes did not have more to do with the planning and scheduling of the event and annoyance at the complicated regulations which succeeded in discouraging so many.

### **The Dallas Story in Review**

On September 7, 1961, the New York Times devoted four full-length columns to the Dallas story. The Superintendent of Schools and the Dallas Citizens Council were lauded for their foresight and planning in desegregating the schools. There were, however, other groups such as the police department and the NAACP who also deserve recognition for their role in the desegregation of schools.

An effective procedure on the part of the planners was to seek out and involve anyone in Dallas having a legitimate concern in desegregation. The seven-man committee of the DCC almost immediately involved seven Negroes who reportedly represented every organized group in the Negro community. They were to report back to others who, in turn, would reach the people themselves (primarily through religious organizations). It was hoped that all of the Negroes in Dallas would feel some sort of personal involvement in the planning stages. It is difficult to assess, after the fact, just how influential the Negro leaders were in the actual planning sessions; whether they simply served as channels of communication or whether they were — in fact as well as in title — participants in the planning, is conjecture. In any case, they were there and they were involved.

The power figures of the city among the white community were also drawn in. Some writers have described this kind of individual as a "legitimizing," one who doesn't actively support a cause, but is able, by his veto, to harm it. Prominent ministers, political leaders, elder statesmen of the city were all solicited for their help. Those in control of the local news media were involved from the very beginning. It was a point of some pride with the reporters who covered the Dallas story that, although they had not published a number of events that could have been reported during 1960 and 1961, they knew at each point what was being done.

An extremely interesting aspect of the whole situation was the focus on universally acceptable goals. Muzafer and Carolyn Sherif, in their book, *An Outline of Social Psychology*, argue against the strict verity of the common supposition that communication between hostile groups tends to reduce tension. The Sherifs point out that communication between such groups can, in fact, increase hostility unless "superordinate goals" are present. As defined by the authors, superordinate goals are those which are larger than individual goals; they cannot be ignored by the participants and no one group can achieve them by itself. The planners in Dallas realized immediately their need for such goals.

The only goal which would be compelling enough to insure cooperation from all elements was that of civic pride or loyalty to Dallas. This theme was developed, knowingly and intentionally, by those who assisted the DCC in its planning. Although this kind of pride may be unique to a city like Dallas, there is usually at least one goal or drive in a city or geographical region appealing enough to transcend local or strictly individual desires and aims.

So strong was the determination to project only the single goal that the planners forewent the opportunity to use public speakers, although they had many competent and well-known civic leaders who would have gladly fulfilled speaking engagements. It was feared that public speakers (especially if questions were invited from the audience) might lose control of the situation, and confuse in some way the appeal to civic pride through obedience to the law.

Although other things could have been done which might have worked very well for the program of desegregation, no element was allowed unless there was full control. One of the consultants to the planners stated that, in the course of discussions as to methods of reaching the lower fifteen to twenty per cent of the economic groups, he had cited various sociological studies indicating that these people were more apt to be related to a church than to any other social group. The consultant proposed using fundamentalist ministers and other religious leaders to assist in the program. This was finally decided against on the grounds that they were not dependably under control.

In addition to local work, it is possible that a general climate of non-violence throughout the nation probably helped to condition thinking for peaceful desegregation in Dallas. Public schools were desegregated in Galveston a few days earlier, in Atlanta a week earlier. Since the Dallas experience, Memphis has desegregated its schools. In each of these cases, there was no violence or threat of violence.

There can be no final conclusion to this report. Change is always at work, whether planned or not. The wise try to control it to some degree and shape it along desirable paths. This is what Dallas has attempted to do. The process continues.

## APPENDIX

### CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

*November 4, 1956:* Dallas City Council drops enforcement of state law requiring racial segregation on buses.

*September 15, 1957:* The pastor of Dallas' First Unitarian Church, in a Sunday sermon, accuses the Dallas school board of subterfuge and "defiance of the law" in postponing desegregation.

*October 19, 1957:* 107 churches of the Greater Dallas Council of Churches are urged to "earnestly and persistently pray for God's enlightenment and guidance" regarding desegregation. In letters to each of the churches, the Council's executive committee asks the congregations to seek spiritual guidance "to the end that the necessary decisions may be made in an atmosphere of Christian understanding and good will . . . Your council has neither the wisdom nor the authority to tell either the civic leaders or the church leaders what specific plans should be adopted."

*November 25, 1957:* A prominent Negro attorney complains to the City Council that when he sought to purchase tickets to the circus in Dallas' Memorial Auditorium he was told he could buy only in a "prescribed area." Dallas' mayor states he "felt sure" the Council would consider the question of segregation in auditorium seating arrangements.

*January 20, 1958:* A white minister turns a city zoning case into an impassioned segregation argument. He requests that the City Council reject a request to permit the construction of apartments and shopping center for Negroes.

*April 27, 1958:* 300 Dallas religious leaders release a manifesto on desegregation, which implies that public school desegregation cannot be escaped by inaction and by trying to forget that the problem exists. It calls upon the school board to be frank with the public and upon the public at large to refrain from any policy or conduct that might lead to a situation like that in Little Rock. The ministers sign it as individuals, not as representatives of any group or organization.

*May 3, 1958:* 115 Dallas Negro clergymen call for an end to "segregation and stratification" and wholeheartedly endorse the stand taken by the 300 white ministers in their manifesto.

*May 17, 1958:* A minister and president of the segregationist White Citizens Council of America release a statement on behalf of some 330 "non-Catholic" ministers in greater Dallas, declaring that enforced integration is wrong.

*April 18, 1959:* Dallas' District Attorney indicates he plans to hire a Dallas Negro lawyer as a combination prosecutor-investigator. This would break the color line in the District Attorney's office.

*September 14, 1959:* Some 875 residents of the Cedar Crest area meet at a local junior high school "to keep our homes desirable." This is the first step in efforts to secure an injunction to keep Dallas realtors from selling homes to Negroes in the area.

*September 30, 1960:* Negro and white pickets, sponsored by the Dallas Community Committee, protest segregated eating facilities at a downtown store. A spokesman for the group states that the protest was staged by the Committee, an organization of some 150 Negro groups and individuals. Possible picketing of "Negro Achievement Day" at the State Fair of Texas announced.

*October 5, 1960:* Picketing of downtown stores continues.

*October 17, 1960:* Negro pickets urge a boycott of the State Fair because of segregationist policies. The demonstration begins at 8 a. m. with two sign-carrying pickets at each of the entrances to the fair grounds. Negro high school students distribute leaflets urging Negroes not to cross the picket lines. Pickets state their presence turned away "many of our people" but fair ground guards state they saw no Negroes discouraged by the pickets.

*March 25, 1960:* A Negro minister from Dallas, accompanied by a white minister from Los Angeles, stages sit-ins at three downtown lunch counters; both are served. Later in the day, the white minister brings a 14-year-old Negro boy to a lunch counter; he too is served.

*March 26, 1960:* Two Negro theology students from Southern Methodist University quietly eat at one downtown lunch counter (part of a national chain).

*January 8, 1961:* A Negro leader and attorney for the NAACP speaks at a "poll tax campaign meeting" of some 500 persons. He calls for vigorous Negro sit-in demonstrations along with economic boycott of several downtown business firms and says that talks of understanding between his Negro committee of seven and the DCC have "broken down." He further notes his deep disappointment with the mayor's lack of action at a recent meeting. The Negro Committee again brings up the question of integration of the State Fair of Texas.

*January 8, 1961:* A Negro pastor who has broken with the Negro committee of seven "for failure to act" charges the white committee with having used the Negroes to restrain peaceful demonstrations while accomplishing nothing.

*January 9, 1961:* A group of 60 SMU students demonstrates against an off-campus drugstore for refusal to serve Negro students at the lunch counter. When they refuse to leave, the owner summons a fumigation service and has the store sprayed with insecticide. Most of the demonstrators remain during the spraying, using handkerchiefs to cover their faces.

*February 12, 1961:* Some 80 Negro youths stage picketing demonstrations in front of downtown movie houses.

*February 26, 1961:* About 40 Negro youths resume stand-ins around theatres.

*March 19, 1961:* Negro leaders at two separate "Freedom Rallies" urge an economic boycott of downtown eating places and segregated movie houses. The meetings are sponsored by the Interdenominational Ministerial Alliance, the Dallas Community Committee and the Youth Council of the NAACP.

*May 24, 1961:* In Detroit, the general manager of the Metropolitan Opera Company says that the time has come "when the Metropolitan Opera can no longer play to segregated audiences." He further states that he has notified sponsoring groups in Atlanta and Dallas of the company's stand against segregation. The president of the Dallas Grand Opera Company states that local Met performances have always been open to all races and that Negroes have been sold seats in all sections and price ranges since the opera started coming to Dallas in 1939.

*August 4, 1961:* A Negro attorney's proposal to allow the construction of apartment buildings for Negroes in the Arlington Park area draws opposition at a meeting of the City Planning Commission.

*September 6, 1961:* Eighteen Negro children attend first grades in eight formerly white schools.

*May, 1962:* Dallas Negro Chamber of Commerce honors 15 leaders of both races who directed the campaign for community acceptance of school desegregation.

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