mitchell v helms cornell
(f) To the extent that Meek and Wolman conflict with the foregoing analysis, they are overruled. for Cert. These objectives are always in some jeopardy since the substantive principle of no aid to religion is not the only limitation on government action toward religion. He relied primarily on Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S. 349, and Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229, in which programs providing many of the same sorts of materials and equipment as does Chapter 2 were struck down, even though programs providing for the loan of public school textbooks to religious schools were upheld. While the textbooks had a known and fixed secular content not readily divertible to religious teaching purposes, the adaptable materials did not.15 So, too, we explained the permissibility of busing on public routes to schools but not busing for field trips designed by religious authorities specifically because the latter trips were components of teaching in a pervasively religious school. See post, at 25–27. Further, in determining that effect, we will consider only the first two Agostini criteria, since neither respondents nor the Fifth Circuit has questioned the District Court’s holding, App. 530US2 Unit: $U84 [11-21-01 16:33:56] PAGES PGT: OPIN OCTOBER TERM, 1999 793 Syllabus MITCHELL etal. Rather, as explained above, the Wolman Court based its holding invalidating the lending of instructional materials and equipment to religious schools on the rationale adopted in Meek—that the secular educational function of a religious school is inseparable from its religious mission. Finally, the JPPSS representative randomly selects library books the nonpublic school has acquired through Chapter 2 and reviews their content to ensure that they comply with the program’s secular content restriction. I agree with the plurality that, like the above evidence of actual diversion, the borrowing of the religious library books constitutes only de minimis evidence. Pp. This preview shows page 5 - 7 out of 25 pages.-Funding Cases o Locke: Declines to follow Lukumi on the grounds that there is no hostility. To resolve the dilemma, the Fifth Circuit abandoned any effort to find coherence in our case law or to divine the future course of our decisions and instead focused on our particular holdings. and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U. S. 646, 657–659 (1980) (approving program providing religious school with “direct cash reimbursement” for expenses of standardized testing). The [state legislature] has not, and could not, provide state aid on the basis of a mere assumption that secular teachers under religious discipline can avoid conflicts. Zobrest, in turning away a challenge based on the pervasively sectarian nature of Salpointe Catholic High School, emphasized the presence of private choice and the absence of government-provided sectarian content. With the same point in mind, we held that buildings constructed with government grants to universities with religious affiliation must be barred from religious use indefinitely to prevent the diversion of government funds to religious objectives. The insufficiency of evenhandedness neutrality as a stand-alone criterion of constitutional intent or effect has been clear from the beginning of our interpretative efforts, for an obvious reason. 25 The Archdiocese’s official policy calls for religious preferences in hiring and the contracts of principals and teachers in its schools contain a provision allowing for termination for lifestyle contrary to the teachings of the Roman Catholic church. Meek and Wolman, on which respondents appear to rely for their divertibility rule, offer little, if any, support for their rule. (e) Applying the two relevant Agostini criteria reveals that there is no basis for concluding that Jefferson Parish’s Chapter 2 program has the effect of advancing religion. Respondents contend that Agostini is distinguishable, pointing to the distinct character of the aid program considered there. Similarly, in Mitchell v. Helms (2000), the Solicitor General, representing the Secretary of Education as a nominal respondent, supported a local government policy that loaned federally subsidized educational materials to religious instructors, despite the First Amendment issue implicated by the case. v. HELMS et al. This is not so at all, however, under the most recent use of “neutrality” to refer to generality or evenhandedness of distribution. 46 F. 3d, at 1465–1466. Compare Wolman, supra, at 248, with Allen, 392 U. S., at 243–245.) I therefore concur in the judgment. First, the record shows actual diversion in the library book program. See supra, at 25–30. 125a (deposition of president of sectarian high school) (“Our teachers, whether they are religion teachers or not, are certainly instructed that when issues come up in the classroom that have a religious, moral, or value concept, that their answers be consistent with the teachings of the Catholic Church and that they respond in that way to the students, so that there can be opportunities in other classes other than religion where discussion of religio[n] could take place, yes, sir”); id., at 73a, 74a. Yet the Court has not accepted the recurrent argument that all aid is forbidden because aid to one aspect of an institution frees it to spend its other resources on religious ends. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U. S. 373, 396 (1985), but we have never delineated the distinction’s contours or held that it is constitutionally required. Such an incentive is not present where the aid is allocated on the basis of neutral, secular criteria that neither favor nor disfavor religion, and is made available to both religious and secular beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatory basis. There, we explained that because we had “abandoned the assumption that properly instructed public employees will fail to discharge their duties faithfully, we must also discard the assumption that pervasive monitoring of Title I teachers is required.” 521 U. S., at 234 (emphasis in original). See ante, at 21–27. Pp. 144a, 150a–151a. So long as the governmental aid is not itself “unsuitable for use in the public schools because of religious content,” Allen, supra, at 245, and eligibility for aid is determined in a constitutionally permissible manner, any use of that aid to indoctrinate cannot be attributed to the government and is thus not of constitutional concern. Agostini’s second primary criterion for determining the effect of governmental aid is closely related to the first. In disregarding the nature of the school, Zobrest and Agostini were merely returning to the approach of Everson and Allen, in which the Court upheld aid programs to students at pervasively sectarian schools. Indeed, Agostini expressly rejected respondents absolute line. of Servs. See post, at 37. The Court explicitly stated that the services in question did not “supplant the remedial instruction and guidance counseling already provided in New York City’s sectarian schools.” 521 U. S., at 229. Thomas, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Scalia and Kennedy, JJ., joined. The governing opinions on the subject in the 35 years since Allen have never challenged this principle. To the extent Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S. 349, and Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229, are inconsistent with the Court’s judgment today, they should be overruled. Thus, the contact person is uninvolved in the actual use of the divertible equipment and, therefore, in no position to know whether diversion has occurred. This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. Looking to our recently decided cases, we articulated three primary criteria to guide the determination whether a government-aid program impermissibly advances religion: (1) whether the aid results in governmental indoctrination, (2) whether the aid program defines its recipients by reference to religion, and (3) whether the aid creates an excessive entanglement between government and religion. And the most recent example of attention to the significance of divertibility occurred in our explanation that public school teachers could be assigned to provide limited instruction in religious schools in Agostini, 521 U. S., at 223–227, a majority of the Court rejecting the factual assumption that public school teachers could be readily lured into providing religious instruction.16. At the state level, the Louisiana Department of Education (the relevant SEA for Louisiana) requires all nonpublic schools to submit signed assurances that they will use Chapter 2 aid only to supplement and not to supplant non-Federal funds, and that the instructional materials and equipment “will only be used for secular, neutral and nonideological purposes.” App. Tilton, 403 U. S., at 679 (“A possibility always exists, of course, that the legitimate objectives of any law or legislative program may be subverted by conscious design or lax enforcement. We granted certiorari. See 403 U. S., at 674–675. 46 F. 3d, at 1464–1465; see Board of Ed. 73 Id. See ante, at 24–25, 26–27, 28–29, 31–34. There is, of course, good reason for considering the generality of aid and the evenhandedness of its distribution in making close calls between benefits that in purpose or effect support a school’s religious mission and those that do not. Mitchell v. Helms Brief . Those decisions adhered to the prior holding in Board of Ed. Again the Court split, upholding the state law in issue, but with Everson’s majority author, Justice Black, now in dissent. 9 The dissent would find an establishment of religion if a government-provided projector were used in a religious school to show a privately purchased religious film, even though a public school that possessed the same kind of projector would likely be constitutionally barred from refusing to allow a student bible club to use that projector in a classroom to show the very same film, where the classrooms and projectors were generally available to student groups. As a way of assuring neutrality, the Court has repeatedly considered whether any governmental aid to a religious institution results from the genuinely independent and private choices of individual parents, e.g., id., at 226. Post, at 27. While respondents appeal was pending, this Court decided Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, approving a program under Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 that provided public employees to teach remedial classes at religious and other private schools. See ante, at 32–33. The plurality has already noted at length the ineffectiveness of the government’s monitoring program. Pp. It was not in place when discovery closed in this matter, and merely highlights the reasons for a lack of evidence on diversion or compliance. In distinguishing between indoctrination that is attributable to the State and indoctrination that is not, we have consistently turned to the principle of neutrality, upholding aid that is offered to a broad range of groups or persons without regard to their religion. 85–5533, 1990 WL 36124 (ED La., Mar. In any event, Chapter 2 contains both a secular content restriction, 20 U. S. C. §7372(a)(1), and a prohibition on the use of aid for religious worship or instruction, §8897, so Tilton provides no basis for upholding respondents’ challenge. Further, as noted, the monitoring system appears adequate to catch those errors that do occur. The type of aid, the structure of the program, and the lack of effective safeguards clearly demonstrate the divertibility of the aid. It not only is far more workable, but also is actually related to real concerns about preventing advancement of religion by government, simply to require, as did Zobrest, Agostini, and Allen, that a program of aid to schools not provide improper content and that it determine eligibility and allocate the aid on a permissible basis.11. §7372(c)(1). Cornell Law School Search Cornell. It then set out three primary criteria for determining a statutes effect: Government aid has the effect of advancing religion if it (1) results in governmental indoctrination, (2) defines its recipients by reference to religion, or (3) creates an excessive entanglement. Id., at 1, n. 1. Like the Ninth Circuit, and unlike the dissent, post, at 22, we “see little difference in loaning science kits to students who then bring the kits to school as opposed to loaning science kits to the school directly.” Walker, supra, at 1468, n. 16; see Allen, 392 U. S., at 244, n. 6. Canon 803, §2, Text & Commentary 568 (“It is necessary that the formation and education given in a Catholic school be based upon the principles of Catholic doctrine; teachers are to be outstanding for their correct doctrine and integrity of life”), and that individual religious teachers will teach religiously.7Lemon, 403 U. S., at 615–620; id., at 635–641 (Douglas, J., concurring); Levitt, 413 U. S., at 480; Meek, 421 U. S., at 369–371; Wolman, 433 U. S., at 249–250 (discussing nonseverability of religious and secular education); Ball, 473 U. S., at 399–400 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part), overruled in part by Agostini, 521 U. S., at 236. To be sure, Agostini only addressed the specific presumption that public-school employees teaching on the premises of religious schools would inevitably inculcate religion. of Servs. (“Neutrality is what is required. Ante, at 27. It thought such an approach required not only by the lack of coherence but also by Agostini’s admonition to lower courts to abide by any applicable holding of this Court even though that holding might seem inconsistent with our subsequent decisions, see Agostini, 521 U. S., at 237. Madison's and Jefferson's now familiar words establish clearly that liberty of personal conviction requires freedom from coercion to support religion, There are numerous reasons to formally dispense with this factor. 14 Many of the other safeguards on which Justice O’Connor relies are safeguards against improper content, not against diversion. See 521 U. S. at 226. Although an accompanying letter indicates that much of the school’s equipment was purchased with federal funds, id., at 205a, the chart does not provide a breakdown identifying specific Chapter 2 usage. Citation 530 US 793 (2000) Argued. App. We held the statute unconstitutional only to the extent that a university’s “obligation not to use the facility for sectarian instruction or religious worship … appear[ed] to expire at the end of 20 years.” Id., at 683. The aid program in Wolman explicitly barred divertible aid, 433 U. S., at 248–249, so a concern for divertibility could not have been part of our reason for finding that program invalid. Allen similarly focused on the fact that the textbooks lent out were “secular” and approved by secular authorities, 392 U. S., at 245, and assumed that the secular textbooks and the secular elements of education they supported were not so intertwined with religious instruction as “in fact [to be] instrumental in the teaching of religion,” id., at 248. 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